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On Saturday afternoons in the fall, my hometown of Athens, Georgia,
becomes a sea of black and red as the Bulldog faithful broadcast their team
loyalty.I They communicate their ties to the football team and to the Universi-
ty of Georgia by dressing in the team colors or by bearing the images of
"UGA" (the Bulldog mascot)2 or other bulldogs associated with the football
program.3 No one walking through campus on game day could retain any
* Associate Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. J.D., 1988, University of
Chicago. Thanks to Robert Denicola for his helpful comments and brilliant work on the new
Restatement.
1. "How 'bout them dawgs?"
2. See JOHN BERENDT, MIDNIGHT IN THE GARDEN OF GOOD AND EVIL 267 (1994). The
beautiful pooch's name is pronounced "UGH-AH."
3. Cf. University of Georgia Athletic Ass'n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985)
(enjoining the unauthorized sale of "Battlin' Bulldog Beer" cans bearing the image of a bulldog).
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doubts about our ability to send messages by what we wear or of the power,
and therefore the value, of those messages.4 Just as obvious is the source of
the value created-not the tiny advertising budget of the University of Georgia
Athletic Association,' but rather the fans themselves, the media sports talk
shows to which they listen, and the magazines and newspapers that they read.
Not only do sports fans express themselves through commercial symbols,
but trademark owners seem to find it impossible to advertise their own goods
and services without referencing the marks or personae of others. When
Samsung Electronics wanted to communicate that its products would endure
through inevitable societal changes in the twenty-first century, it didn't just say
so; it communicated the notion of social evolution by employing a metallic
Vanna White robot revealing letters in a futuristic version of "Wheel of
Fortune." 6 In the same vein, a recent advertisement for a luxury car
communicates its message of sleekness and high performance by associating
the car with the image of James Bond.7
Our inability to express ourselves without the help of symbols and images
originally introduced into commerce by others poses special problems for the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (Restatement).8 As the value of
commercial symbols9 has increased, those with credible claims for protection
under intellectual property laws have inevitably sought to expand their
4. Many commentators have noted how consumers both appropriate trademarks as part of
their identity and also vastly increase the value of the marks through their use of them. See
Rosemary J. Coombe, Publicity Rights and PoliticalAspiration: Mass Culture, Gender Identity,
and Democracy, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1221, 1230-35 (1992); Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects
of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic Dialogue, 69
TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991) [hereinafter Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics]; Rochelle
C. Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent?, 20 COLUM.-
VLA J.L. & ARTS 123 (1996) [hereinafter We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols]; Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Alex Kosinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960
(1993); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL L. REV. 127 (1993).
5. The Athletic Association spends about $100,000 advertising for the University's various
sports teams. Apparently, the emphasis is on promoting minor sports since the football program
generates adequate publicity on its own. Approximately another$50,000 is witheld from royalties
paid by liscencees in return for promoting Georgia marks on merchandise. Telephone
conversation with Avery McClean, University of Georgia Sports Information Office (May 16,
1996).
6. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
7. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287
(C.D. Cal. 1995).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1993) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT).
9. The term "commercial symbols" will be used to refer to trademarks and rights ofpublicity
that have value in promoting the sale of goods and services.
[Vol. 47:783
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interests.'" Nonetheless, the express rationale of the case law generally
continues to emphasize the traditional concerns of protecting consumers from
confusion and deception in the marketplace, thus resisting the analogy that
commercial symbols are property like any other." The drafting of the
Restatement presented a promising opportunity to clarify the viability of the
competing claims of "owners" and users of commercial symbols.
Overall, the Restatement is an overwhelming success, a careful and honest
exposition of the black letter law annotated with clear explanations of the
policies that drive judicial decisions governing trademarks, trade secrets,
publicity rights, false advertising, and unfair competition. Despite its
impressive coverage of the field, however, the Restatement's treatment of the
law of trademarks and publicity rights does not adequately address several
problems raised by common uses of commercial symbols. These problems
arise most frequently when famous trademarks are used on promotional
goods 2 and when allusions to famous personae are employed to describe
goods and services.
Consider the following two examples. After the World Series, an
entrepreneur sells high quality T-shirts, coffee mugs, pens, ashtrays, etc.,
bearing the trademark "Atlanta Braves." All these promotional goods are
plainly labeled as unauthorized by the Atlanta Braves. No consumer is likely
to be confused at the point of purchase. A second example is a local automo-
bile dealership that advertises its manufacturer's new sports car as having
"finer lines than Sharon Stone, quicker moves than Michael Jordan, and more
power than Mike Tyson." The dealership's allusions are made in an effort to
sell its product, but consumers are not likely to believe that Stone, Jordan, or
Tyson endorse or are formally associated with the car. These two examples
share several features. First, they are both commercial uses of images
employed with a blatant profit motive. Second, neither use involves consumer
deception at the point of sale. Third, under traditional common law principles
governing unfair competition, neither use is actionable.
An examination of the relevant Restatement sections governing trademark
dilution,' 3 functionality, " likelihood of confusion, 5 confusion as to
10. See Judge Kozinski's list of outrageous recent claims in White v. Samsung Elecs. Am.,
Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512-13 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of en bane
rehearing) (noting among many examples that Chef Paul Prudhomme has demanded protection
from "ads featuring corpulent bearded chefs"); see also Prudhomme v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
800 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. La. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
11. Cf. Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone; Brand Equity
as Protectable Property, the New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (1994).
12. The phrase "promotional goods" will be used to describe the ornamental use of a famous
trademark on a good, not to indicate the source of the good, but rather to make it more attractive
to potential buyers. See Peter E. Mims, Note, Promotional Goods andthe Functionality Doctrine:
An Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 TEX. L. REV. 639, 663-64 (1984).
13. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 25 ("Liability Without Proof of Confusion: Dilution
1996]
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sponsorship, 6 and publicity rights17 does not provide the guidance necessary
to address fully the problems raised in the paradigm set forth above. Given the
ubiquitous borrowing of commercial symbols in American culture, the need
for clear rules is obvious. In light of prior case law and sound public policy,
the Restatement could have mediated more completely the severe tension
between the claims of the originators of commercial symbols and the interests
of consumers and recyclers of them. The Restatement should have clarified
that the ornamental use of trademarks on quality promotional goods is
permissible in the absence of point of sale confusion and that many nonconfus-
ing uses of public personae in advertising do not constitute the actionable
appropriation of trade values.
I. TRADEMARKS USED ON PROMOTIONAL GOODS
A discussion of the issues raised in a case involving the unauthorized use
of trademarks owned by Ford Motor Company illustrates some of the
problems caused by the Restatement's failure to address promotional uses of
trademarks in a single comprehensive section.
A. The Plasticolor Problem
In 1973, Plasticolor Molded Products began the unauthorized marketing
of automobile floor mats and other accessories bearing a variety of Ford
trademarks. 8 Consumers who bought unaccessorized cars from Ford, or
those who needed replacement items, were able to take advantage of the
competition provided by Plasticolor in this particular market. After Ford
prevailed in 1988 on a claim that Plasticolor products,' 9 in particular its floor
mats, were likely to confuse consumers as to the source or sponsorship of its
products,2" Plasticolor changed its packaging to identify itself more clearly
as manufacturer. It also added a disclaimer of any connection with Ford.2
and Tarnishment").
14. Id. § 17 ("Functional Designs").
15. Id. § 21 ("Proof of Likelihood of Confusion: Market Factors").
16. Id. § 20 ("Standard of Infringement").
17. Id. § 46 ("Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person's Identity: The Right of
Publicity").
18. See Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (C.D. Cal.
1989) (Kozinski, J., sitting by designation), vacated by consent judgment, 767 F. Supp. 1036
(C.D. Cal. 1991).
19. Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 698 F. Supp. 199 (C.D. Cal. 1988)
(Kozinski, J., sitting by designation).
20. This claim was broughtunderthe LanhamAct, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1994), which provides
a cause of action for trademark infringement for owners of federally registered trademarks.
21. Plasticolor, 713 F. Supp. at 1335 (The disclaimer read: "NOTICE-This product is not
[Vol. 47:783
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A similar identification of origin and disclaimer were printed on the back of
each floormat, although the Ford trademark remained emblazoned on the
front.22
When Ford brought suit again, Judge Kozinski found that the packaging
changes had eliminated the likelihood of consumer confusion at the point of
sale.' Although he recognized the possibility of confusion among some post-
sale observers of the mats, he was unwilling to grant Ford's motion for
summary judgment, implicitly approving of Plasticolor's practice if it could
demonstrate that it had taken all reasonable steps to diminish the likelihood of
such confusion. He noted that "[p]rotecting functional copying of trademarks
[requires] that we tolerate at least some confusion as to source or sponsorship
after the point of sale."'24
Ford's claim of trademark dilution under California law,' which does
not require a showing of consumer confusion, was also rejected. 6 Judge
Kozinski found that
[t]he mats contain clear legible and accurate depictions of various Ford
trademarks and logos. They are sold to the public for use in conjunction
with Ford products, giving consumers the opportunity to express their
allegiance to their Ford-manufactured automobiles. If anything, such use
is likely to increase the distinctiveness of Ford's marks. 27
In denying Ford summary judgment, the opinion directly confronts the issues
raised by promotional goods in a way the Restatement does not.
B. A Normative Interlude
Before comparing Judge Kozinski's approach with the relevant Restate-
ment sections, a brief discussion of public policy concerns underlying
trademark law might help readers whose intuitive reaction is to condemn
Plasticolor's blatant copying as "free-riding" or worse.
If Ford, the Atlanta Braves, or any other entity whose marks are likely
to be attractive on promotional goods, is granted the exclusive right to exploit
its marks on such goods, then consumers will pay higher prices than they
authorized, sponsored, or manufactured by Ford Motor Co.").
22. Id. at 1335.
23. Id. at 1339-40.
24. Id. at 1339.
25. See CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 14330(a) (West 1987) (providing injunctiverelief against
a trademark use likely to cause "injury to business reputation or ... dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark registered under this chapter").
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would in the presence of open competition. If anyone can sell an Atlanta
Braves T-shirt, the median price will be lower than if only one entity has the
right to sell that T-shirt. Without competition, a potential monopoly problem
emerges because promotional goods are not fungible in the eyes of consumers.
For example, if I want to wear a Georgia Bulldog cap on Saturday, a Florida
Gator cap simply will not do.2" Granting exclusive rights in the promotional
goods context permits monopoly pricing and, therefore, entails a transfer of
wealth from consumers to trademark owners.29 We need a justification before
mandating that transfer by law.
The most convincing way for trademark owners to defend their requests
for exclusive rights would be to demonstrate that the public would benefit
from that protection. For example, when consumers are confused as to the
source or sponsorship of promotional goods, trademark owners can plausibly
argue that a legal remedy should be available to them. If a significant number
of buyers of goods bearing the Georgia Bulldog trademark believe that the
goods originate at the University of Georgia, or that the University's athletic
programs directly profit from sales made under license,30 then those consum-
ers should be protected from the deception and confusion caused by unautho-
rized sales. Consumers are not always indifferent to the source or sponsorship
of promotional goods. Protecting consumer expectation is reasonable and,
moreover, almost certainly economically efficient.3
In situations where consumers are not likely to be confused as to source
or sponsorship, either because they are indifferent or because of an effective
28. Professor Denicola does not address this point in his insightful article on trademark
merchandising. See Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the
Merchandising of Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603 (1984). He argues that
wholesalers are ambivalent as to the particular ornamental marks that they place on promotional
goods. Id. at 604. In other words, famous marks may be fungible at the wholesale level. At the
retail level, this is obviously not true. A consumer usually looks for a specific good adorned by
a specific mark. An exclusive licensee of the trademark owner will be able to charge a monopoly
price to that consumer. The indifference of an exclusive licensee to the trademarks it obtains does
not help the consumer, who still pays the non-competitive price. In theory, a trademark owner
might grant several non-exclusive licenses, thereby generating price-reducing competition. Why
would a trademark owner do that when economics predicts a higher return for an owner who can
either directly or indirectly (through an exclusive licensee) capture monopoly rents? The trade-
mark owner might choose to grant multiple licenses to exploit distinct markets.
29. This is not true in the typical context of trademarks that are used to identify the source
of goods. Basing trademark rights on the prevention of consumer confusion as to source raises
no significantmonopoly problem. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:
An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 273-75 (1987); see also EDMUND W. KITCH
& HARVEY S. PERLMAN, LEGAL REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE PROCEss 65-73 (4th ed. rev.
1991) and sources cited therein.
30. Some consumers are likely to be willing to pay more for a T-shirt if the marginal extra
cost of the shirt will help finance more scholarships or a new scoreboard.
31. See Landes & Posner, supra note 29, at 268-73.
[Vol. 47:783
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disclaimer, trademark owners are hard-pressed to identify a reason why they
should be able to charge monopoly prices. One might be tempted to offer a
copyright or patent-like incentive argument: Without protection, businesses
will develop fewer famous marks to adorn promotional goods. Given existing
incentives for manufacturers to identify their goods and services with
distinctive trademarks, this argument scarcely seems plausible.32 In fact, the
United States Supreme Court recently noted that it is not the "province" of
trademark law "to encourage invention by granting inventors a monopoly over
new product designs. . .. ""
Some have argued that permitting unauthorized ornamental uses of marks
inevitably leads to the "dilution" of the distinctive quality of a trademark, even
in the absence of confusion as to source. A trademark is a valuable business
asset. Damage to a trademark results in a tangible loss to a business' bottom
line. Nonetheless, no common law jurisdiction has ever determined that
trademark owners should have a remedy in the absence of confusion.34 The
Restatement recognizes the existence of state dilution statutes, but explains that
they should not be interpreted to provide a remedy for a nontrademark use of
a famous mark, such as the use of a famous mark to adorn a promotional
good, rather than to identify its source.35
Although their arguments have never been accepted by the courts, some
recent commentators have suggested that a trademark is a business asset,36
just like any other, and should be protected from unauthorized uses in the
32. See Denicola, supra note 28, at 635 ("[TMrademark owners are forced to counter the
claims of inefficiency by arguing that the failure to extend protection will undermine the incentive
to produce the merchandising properties fancied by the public. The chief difficulty with this
response is that in most instances it simply is not credible. Collateral sources of incentive will
frequently dwarf the additional stimulus provided by the prospect of an exclusive merchandising
right.").
33. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1304 (1995).
34. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 25, reporters' note to cmt. a. Congress has just
enacted the first federal dilution statute, providing injunctive relief to the trademark owner for
dilution of the mark. Dilution is defined as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competit-
ion between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception." Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat.
985 (creating section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West Supp. 1996)).
35. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 25(1) (providing liability only for the unauthorized
use of the mark "in a manner that is likely to associate the other's mark with the goods, services,
or business of the [user]"), clarified in RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 25 cmt. a (liability is
incurred "only when the actor uses the other's mark as a means of identification for the actor's
own goods"). Section 25 does permit relief for a non-source-identifying use of another's mark
that "meets the requirements of a cause of action for defamation, invasion of privacy, or injurious
falsehood." Id. § 25(2).
36. See Swann & Davis, supra note 11; cf. Denicola, supra note 28, at 637-41.
1996]
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same way the law protects the tangible assets of a business.37 This argument
misunderstands the public good aspect of ornamental trademarks.
A public good has a main identifying feature: it may be used over and
over again without being damaged or wearing out. 38 For example, a song is
a public good because it may be sung over and over without being rendered
less capable of being sung again. A lighthouse is a public good because the
wear and tear on the lighthouse is not related to the number of ships that
navigate by its light. Importantly, the focus is not the effect of each subsequent
use on the market value of the good, but rather on whether it can equally be
used again. For example, a well-known but lousy recording of a song might
negatively affect its market value; nonetheless, the song retains its public good
aspect because it can be sung just a cheaply again by another. The failure to
appreciate this distinction mars an otherwise thoughtful analysis of the
promotional goods issue by at least one commentator.
3 9
Once a public good comes into existence, restricting access to it imposes
a cost.40 Unless we worry about maintaining incentives for their cre-
ation-and, as noted above, we do not in the case of trademarks 41-we cannot
easily justify restricting the public's access to true public goods.4" Efficiency
demands free access to valuable goods when the marginal cost of each
successive use is zero.
Normally, a trademark used as a source identifier is not a public good.
As Landes and Posner succinctly note: "A proper trademark is not a public
good; it has social value only when used to designate a single brand."43 That
value, of course, can be damaged by subsequent uses of the mark that are
inconsistent with its source identification function, such as the infringing use
of the mark on similar goods manufactured by another party. A trademark
expresses to the public: "This good comes from [trademark owner]."
37. See Swann & Davis, supra note 11, at 220.
38. For a short general discussion, see ARMEN A. ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EX-
CHANGE AND PRODUCTION: THEORY IN USE 251-53 (1969), reprinted in EDMUND W. KITCH &
HARVEY S. PERLMAN, supra note 29, at 47-49.
39. See Denicola, supra note 28, at 637 (indicating that potential diminution of market value
through over-exploitation is the measure of whether something is a public good).
40. See ALCHIAN & ALLEN, supra note 38, at 253; Landes & Posner, supra note 29, at 267-
68 ("When the marginal cost of using a resource is zero, excluding someone from using it creates
a deadweight loss .... ).
41. See supra note 32.
42. Copyright law and patent law, both of which restrict access to public goods, are justified
on the ground that incentives are necessary to maintain optimal production of artistic creations
and inventions. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428-29
(1984); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954).
43. See Landes & Posner, supra note 29, at 274.
[Vol. 47:783
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Infringing uses of the mark render that representation untrustworthy; thus, the
marginal cost of each successive infringing use is greater than zero.
The ornamental use of a trademark, however, has a much stronger public
goods aspect. Because it serves to adorn a product, not to identify the
product's source of manufacture, its value is not reduced by each successive
use. My Georgia Bulldog socks say, "I love the Georgia Bulldogs." That
statement is just as true and trustworthy irrespective of how many other fans
adorn themselves with the Bulldog trademark and irrespective of how many
different manufacturers produce goods with Bulldogs on them. To repeat, the
fact that a market can get oversaturated with a public good, thereby reducing
its market value, does not diminish its status as a public good. Although
avocado green" still has not recovered from its overuse in the kitchen decor
of the late 1960s and early 1970s, it remains, nonetheless, a public good, as
all colors are.
Obviously, market saturation might conceivably reduce the source
identifying value of a mark. Two responses can be made to this concern. First,
as Judge Kozinski suggests in Plasticolor, ornamental uses on quality goods
probably enhance and "increase the distinctiveness" of trademarks.45 Second,
the mere possibility of a diminution in value should not offset the certain and
measurable costs that would be imposed on consumers if exclusive rights were
to be granted to trademark owners. The law has never permitted trademark
owners to protect their trademarks from unauthorized ornamental uses to the
same absolute extent they may protect their machinery from vandals. The
public goods aspect of ornamental marks demands the more narrowly tailored,
confusion-based approach taken by the common law.
Trademark owners have never been able to show that granting them
plenary protection from unauthorized uses would work a net public benefit. Of
course, the failure to grant exclusive rights allows "poaching" and "free
riding," but we must not forget that the public is the main beneficiary of the
ubiquitous free-riding in which all businesses engage in some way or another.
When Chrysler advertising convinced American car buyers that the minivan
was a superior product, Ford and Chevrolet quickly took advantage of the new
taste created by Chrysler's expenditures by marketing their competing versions
of the same vehicle. Nothing is more time-honored in American business than
free-riding on the efforts of another (who, of course, has gotten a free ride
himself along the way).
In its most famous trademark case, the Court recognized that as long as
the consumer is not deceived, free-riding is encouraged by the law.46 In
44. And remember that lovely shade of harvest gold?
45. Plasticolor Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329, 1349 (C.D. Cal.
1989).
46. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
1996]
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response to Nabisco's complaint that Kellogg was benefitting from its massive
advertising expenditures to promote "Shredded Wheat," Justice Brandeis
stated:
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the article
known as "Shredded Wheat"; and thus is sharing in a market which was
created by the skill and judgment of plaintiff's predecessor and has been
widely extended by vast expenditures in advertising persistently made. But
that is not unfair. Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by
patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed by all-and in the
free exercise of which the consuming public is deeply interested.47
We should not let admonitions made by our second-grade teachers concerning
the evil of copying spelling words from our classmates' tests prevent us from
appreciating the vast good that comes from commercial free-riding in the
absence of deception or confusion.
To conclude this policy discussion, let me increase the trademark owner's
burden even more by noting the commentary of those who assert that we
typically overestimate the extent to which a trademark's original inventor is
responsible for the totality of its value. 48 The University of Georgia Bulldogs
trademark is extremely valuable. But why? Certainly not because of its
uniqueness-"the Bulldogs" is one of the three most common team names in
America.49 Vast expenditures on advertising by the University are not
necessary; although they advertise game dates and related events, there is no
expensive media blitz to attract fan support.50 The trademark is extremely
valuable because the fans love the team, because the newspapers saturate the
public with coverage from the first day of spring practice, because magazines
feature Bulldog players on their covers, because we talk about "them 'dawgs"
whenever we can. The University of Georgia has probably never been the
primary user of its football team's trademark, except to identify a service it
provides to hungry fans eleven, and sometimes twelve, Saturdays a year.
Overprotection of its mark would, in the words of Rosemary Coombe, "stifle
dialogic practices-preventing us from using the most powerful, prevalent, and
accessible cultural forms to express identity, community, and difference.""
Noting the extent to which a famous trademark's value is generated by the
public does not suggest that the fans should be able to market a competing
47. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
48. See supra note 4.
49. "The Eagles" and "The Tigers" are the other two. See Kim Q. Berkshire, What's in a
Nickname, Los ANGELES TIMES (San Diego County Edition), Sept. 14, 1989, at liB.
50. See supra note 5.
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football team. But it does indicate that granting exclusive rights to the initial
coiner of a mark would transfer something of great value from those who have
actively and purposely participated in its development. The recognition of the
varied sources of value of an ornamental trademark, combined with the
economic aspects of its public goods character, should be enough to challenge
any lingering notion that the mere fact of copying by an entrepreneur, like
Plasticolor, should inevitably result in liability.
C. Questions Raised by Plasticolor and the Restatement
The Restatement reveals some troublesome ambiguities when parsed in
light of Plasticolor. The case is valuable, not because of its precedential
value, 2 but because it lays out a coherent roadmap for the analysis of the
important issues involving promotional goods.
1. Functionality of "Mixed-Use" Marks
Plasticolor argued that the Ford trademarks that it appropriated were
"functional" as applied to automobile floor mats and other such accessories,
and were therefore unprotectable as a matter of law. In denying Plasticolor's
motion for summary judgment, Judge Kozinski noted that a product feature is
functional, and therefore unprotected, "if it is essential to the use or purpose
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article." 53 He found that
the floor mats were generally purchased by Ford car owners who wanted
matching mats bearing the Ford mark or a specific car model trademark like
"Mustang;" therefore, use of the mark certainly had a functional aspect. Given
consumer preferences for matching mats, the Ford marks were essential to the
purpose of the article. A similar case driven by consumer preference likewise
held that "John Deere green" was functional and unprotectable when used on
farm equipment given farmers' desires to match the color of what they tow to
the towing vehicle.54
In the case of floor mats, however, the Ford trademark also had a source-
identifying function. Ford makes floor mats and affixes its name to identify
52. Although Judge Kozinski is an appellate judge on the Ninth Circuit, Plasticolor is a
district court opinion, vacated after the parties entered into a consent decree. See Plasticolor
Molded Prods. v. Ford Motor Co., 713 F. Supp. 1329 (C.D. Cal. 1989), vacated by consent
order, 767 F. Supp. 1036 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
53. Id. at 1336 (quoting Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1982)).
54. Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd721 F.2d 253
(8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam); see also Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527
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itself as the source of manufacture. Kozinski was unwilling to hold, as he
claimed the Third"5 and Sixth 6 Circuit Courts of Appeals implicitly had,
that the functional features of a mark trump the source-identifying features,
resulting in no protection. Nor was he willing to find that the existence of
a source-identifying role for the mark, a role that some ornamental trademarks
play,5 8 meant plenary protection in the absence of confusion. 9
The opinion asserts that the law should try to protect both the functional
and the source-identifying aspects of trademarks placed on promotional goods.
The identification of this duality, associated with what Judge Kozinski terms
"mixed-use" trademarks, is critical to understanding the tension that exists
between cases that seem to grant plenary protection to ornamental marks'
and those that can be interpreted to provide little or no protection. 6' Before
we examine the Plasticolor opinion's search for a "middle ground," we should
look at the relevant sections of the Restatement.
2. Ornamental Marks and Section 17
Section 17 of the Restatement describes a trademark as functional if it
"affords benefits in. . .marketing . . . apart from any benefits attributable to
the design's significance as an indication of source, that are important to
effective competition . . . and that are not practically available through the use
of alternative designs."62 On it face, this language would seem to cover
virtually all mixed uses of trademarks, which by definition exhibit attributes
other than as "an indication of source," including the use by Plasticolor of the
Ford mark. Under section 16 of the Restatement, therefore, a product feature
that embodied both functional and source-identifying aspects would be
"ineligible for protection as a mark."63 Section 16, however, only speaks to
"product designs," and along with the comments and illustrations to section
55. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
56. See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg., 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972) (per
curiam).
57. Plasticolor, 713 F. Supp. at 1338.
58. Ralph Lauren's Polo pony, for example.
59. Plasticolor, 713 F. Supp. at 1337.
60. Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d
1004 (5th Cir.) (enjoining seller of replicas of team emblems), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
61. Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079
(5th Cir. 1982) (allowing the sale ofjewelry that incorporated the fraternal emblem); International
Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980) (same), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981).
62. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 17.
63. Id. § 16.
[Vol. 47:783
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 4 [1996], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol47/iss4/8
TRADEMARKS AND PUBLICITY RIGHTS
17 makes clear that ornamental marks are excluded from the purview of the
functionality sections.
It is clear that section 17 was not intended to cover ornamental uses of
trademarks on promotional goods at all. The comments do not discuss the sort
of mixed-use trademarks that are at issue in Plasticolor or similar well-known
cases.' The five relevant illustrations do not offer for consideration any
ornamental uses of marks on promotional goods." The Reporters' note states
that "[i]f the advantage of a particular design lies solely in its association with
a specific source, the design is not 'functional' under the rule stated in this
[s]ection. "I One of the three cases cited for this proposition is the controver-
sial decision in Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Manufacturing, Inc. ,67 which enjoined the sale of sports team emblems. The
Reporters' note acknowledges the opposite proposition, citing three cases,6"
including Plasticolor, that identify the functional aspects of mixed-use
trademarks of the sort discussed here.
The relevant portion of the Reporters' note to section 17 concludes
abruptly that "the rule stated in this [s]ection is inapplicable" because cases
like Plasticolor do not involve "the eligibility of the design for protection as
a trademark, but rather the scope of permissible use of a trademark by
another." 69 This exclusion of promotional goods cases from consideration
under the functionality doctrine has no support in other Restatement sections,
academic commentary, or case law. Despite the assertion in the Reporters'
note, section 17 itself does not involve the eligibility of a design feature for
protection. Many functional designs serve as source identifiers and have
secondary meaning.70 Its subject-functionality-is traditionally considered
64. See supra notes 60-61.
65. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 17 cmt. c, illus. 5-9. The accompanying Reporters'
note mentions briefly that "[s]everal decisions invoke the concept of aesthetic functionality to
justify a denial of protection to ornamental features that are not distinctive of source." Id. § 17,
reporters' note to cmt. c (citing Damn I'm Good, Inc. v. Sakowitz, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 1357
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("Damn I'm Good" not protected for jewelry and other items); PPS, Inc. v.
Jewelry Sales Representatives, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (jewelry shaped like fruit
and adorned with "I Like You" unprotected)).
66. Id. § 17, reporters' note to cmt. b.
67. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
68. See International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir.
1980) (identifying functional aspects of symbols of fraternal order on jewelry), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 941 (1981); University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711 (W.D.
Pa. 1983) (finding the University of Pittsburgh sports team insignia functional on promotional
goods).
69. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 17, reporters' note to cmt. b. The reader is then directed
to section 20, where we will proceed momentarily.
70. See Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that even though tableware design was distinctive and had secondary meaning,
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a defense to trademark infringement, 7' applicable only after the plaintiff has
made a prima facie showing that its design identifies its source to consum-
ers.72 A defendant arguing functionality states, in essence, "Yes, you may
have a design feature that is distinctive or has obtained secondary meaning in
the market, but public policy demands that I, nonetheless, be able to capture
its functional aspects."
In spite of the statement to the contrary in the Reporters' note, section 17
itself clearly focuses on the "scope of permissible use of a trademark by anoth-
er." 7 3 The comments explain that the functionality defense identifies
"situations in which the public and private interest in avoiding confusion is
outweighed by the anticompetitive consequences of trademark protection."'74
In other words, the privilege to use a functional design presumes the existence
of an otherwise valid trademark, the copying of which might confuse the
public. The bottom line is that "[c]ompetitors thus remain free . . . to copy
functional designs regardless of any association with a particular source." 75
In addition, the illustrations all concern the scope of permissible use, rather
than eligibility. 76 To push the discussion of a case like Plasticolor out of the
scope of section 17 on the ground that it does not really involve the functional-
ity issue makes little sense.
The absence of a discussion in section 17 addressing functionality and
mixed-use trademarks is especially jarring given the relevance of the
commentary and illustrations accompanying the section. Comment c states that
"the fact that the design performs a function by contributing to the aesthetic
value of the product does not in itself render the design ineligible for
proof of the aesthetic functionality of the design provided a complete defense).
71. See Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 862-63 (1982) (stating that
"functionality offers a complete affirmative defense"); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71
F.3d 996, 1005 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying "the aesthetic functionality defense").
72. Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc., 916 F.2d at 79.
73. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 17, reporters' note to cmt. b.
74. Id. § 17 cmt. b.
75. Id.
76. For example, illustration 8 states:
A is the first seller to market candy intended for Valentine's Day in heart-shaped
boxes. Evidence establishes that the shape of the box is an important factor in the
appeal of the product to a significant number of consumers. Because there are no
alternative designs capable of satisfying the aesthetic desires of these prospective
purchasers, the design of the box is functional under the rule stated in this Section.
Id. § 17 cmt. c, illus. 8. The illustration does not state that a heart-shaped box is ineligible for
trademark protection. One can imagine many situations where a heart-shaped container might well
be eligible for protection, such as for packaging motor oil. The illustration merely states that
using a heart-shaped box to sell Valentine's Day candy is within the scope of permissible uses,
even if some consumers assume all such boxes come from the original producer. See also Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121 (1938).
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protection as a trademark."' This comment implicitly recognizes the mixed-
use aspects of many ornamental marks, suggesting that in some circumstances
mixed-use marks can be protected. The subsequent commentary and illustra-
tions discuss ornamental features of luggage designs, china patterns, candy
boxes, and lighting fixtures, and focus on the existence of alternative designs
available to those who want to compete. For example, an aesthetically pleasing
china pattern that indicates source may be copied only if other similar pleasing
designs are not available,7" but a heart-shaped candy box may be freely
copied given the lack of real alternatives for Valentine's Day packaging.79
Of course, if the availability of alternative designs to competitors is the
key to determining functionality, then most mixed-use marks of the type
discussed in this paper are unprotected. Those wanting to sell car mats to Ford
owners or baseball caps to Bulldog fans have no real alternatives in choosing
the ornamentation necessary to satisfy buyers. Although the sellers of both
Valentine's Day candy and baseball caps have, in theory, many different
design options, the commentary and illustrations in section 17 suggest that
market demand dictates the functionality of desirable ornamental product
features. However, the absence of any specific discussion of promotional
goods and the contrary language in the Reporters' note indicate that, despite
the relevance of the illustrations and comments, section 17 was not intended
to provide a safe harbor for those who market unauthorized promotional
goods.
The absence of a straightforward confrontation of the functionality issue
raised by the use of ornamental marks on promotional goods does little to help
resolve the critical problem recognized by the court in Plasticolor.
3. The "Middle Ground" Offered by Judge Kozinski
In addressing the issue posed by Plasticolor's "Ford" floormats, Judge
Kozinski begins by recognizing two potentially conflicting principles of
trademark law: (1) trademark owners should be protected from confusing uses
of source-identifying features of their products, and (2) functional product
features should be free for all to copy. 0 He notes that "[t]here need be no
conflict between the two principles at the point of sale" because "[tjhe
functional use of a trademark does not preclude a clear indication at the point
of sale (in the form of a label, packaging, or other identification easily
77. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 17 cmt. c. ("When aesthetic considerations play an
important role in the purchasing decisions of prospective consumers, a design feature that
substantially contributes to the aesthetic appeal of a product may qualify as 'functional.'")
(emphasis added).
78. See id. § 17 cmt. c, illus. 6.
79. See id. § 17 cmt. c, illus. 8.
80. Plasticolor, 713 F. Supp. at 1339.
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removed or concealed by the consumer) that the product is not manufactured
or sponsored by [trademark owner]."8" The real problem arises after the
point of sale, when the disclaimer or label has been removed. This possibility
of post-sale confusion raises a complex issue that should have merited its own
separate subsection in the Restatement.
After the sale of a "Ford" floor mat or other promotional good, observers
may be confused as to the product's source unless it bears an indelible
disclaimer. The court in Plasticolor points out, however, that "[a] floor mat
whose upper surface reads 'FORD (not authorized by Ford Motor Company)'
would obviously attract few customers."' An absolute requirement of such
a disclaimer would not establish a middle ground at all, but rather, would
"materially interfere with the trademark's functional purpose." 3 Judge
Kozinski concludes that the law must "tolerate at least some confusion as to
source or sponsorship after the point of sale."' On the other hand, he
recognizes that the failure to require any steps to be taken to reduce post-sale
confusion might seriously interfere with the source-identifying function of the
marks.
In order to balance the interests at stake, the opinion suggests an ad hoc
approach that requires the manufacturer of a promotional good to "take all
reasonable steps to eliminate post-sale confusion consistent with the functional
use of the mark."' At a minimum, the opinion seems to require clear
labeling on some part of the promotional good; for example, on the back of
a floor mat or on the tag of a T-shirt or cap. 6 Cost-effective measures, if
available, must be taken to reduce post-sale confusion. In some cases advertis-
ing in various forms may be effective to inform consumers that not all
products bearing a particular ornamental mark spring from the same source.
Judge Kozinski's middle ground, even to the extent it permits some
confusion, is consistent with the Supreme Court's approach to the use of





85. Plasticolor, 713 F. Supp. at 1339.
86. However, it may not be feasible to affix a disclaimer on some items, like jewelry. See id.
at 1339-40.
87. Generic marks and functional marks have much in common. They both are freely available
to those who need them to market their goods, and the procompetition rationale for that
availability is the same. Cf. A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986)
(needs of competition demand that the term "chocolate fudge" be generic and unprotectable as
a trademark for rich chocolate soda) with Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art
Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990) (competition demands that "baroque" style silverware be
functional and unprotectable as a trademark).
88. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119-20 (1938). See supra notes 46
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the term "shredded wheat," and the pillow-shaped wheat biscuit itself, to be
unprotected by trademark law. Even though the Court recognized the
possibility of consumer confusion stemming from Nabisco's long use of the
mark and "vast expenditures of advertising persistently made,"89 Kellogg was
permitted to make use of the mark and the product design as long as it took
"every reasonable precaution to prevent confusion."' In fact, in its recogni-
tion that the mark was generic and/or functional for most consumers, but
might still serve a source-identifying function for others, the Court was
confronting the same problem posed by mixed-use marks. Its solution to the
problem, so similar to Judge Kozinski's, bears repeating: The obligation
imposed upon Kellogg Company, the second-comer, was not to ensure that
every purchaser could distinguish its product from Nabisco's, but rather to use
"every reasonable means to prevent confusion." 9' A standard requiring
reasonable means be taken to prevent post-sale confusion allows a court to
recognize both the functional and source-identifying aspects of mixed-use
trademarks.
4. Section 20 of the Restatement
The complex issue presented above is partially addressed in a disjointed
manner within the comments and illustrations of Restatement section 20,
entitled "Standard of Infringement."' The text of section 20 does not
mention post-sale confusion or make distinctions between marks that have only
a source-identifying aspect and those that also have functional features. The
comments make clear the result in easy cases where "prospective purchasers"
are either confused (liability) or not confused (no liability) at the point of sale
as to whether promotional goods are sponsored by the trademark owner.93
The difficulty, as illustrated in Plasticolor, is how to deal with the issue of
post-sale confusion. Here, the Restatement is particularly unhelpful. According
to the comments, creating the likelihood of confusion after a sale can be
actionable, especially in the case of counterfeit goods.94 The comments also
& 47 and accompanying text.
89. Id. at 122.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 121.
92. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 20 (infringement liability requires a use of a mark that
causes a likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, association, certification, or approval).
93. Id. § 20 cmt. b ("If prospective purchasers falsely believe that the trademark owner is the
source or sponsor of the merchandise, there is a likelihood of confusion actionable under the rule
stated here. On the other hand, if the use merely causes prospective purchasers to recognize the
mark as a reference to the trademark owner, the use is not an infringement.").
94. Id. The Restatement observes that a manufacturer who sells fake Rolexes to a fully-
informed street vendor should nonetheless be liable for trademark infringement. Id. The potential
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note, however, that "[o]n the other hand, not every instance of potential
confusion by third persons sufficiently threatens the commercial interests of the
trademark owner to constitute an infringement."95
What constitutes a "sufficient threat to commercial interests" is not set
forth completely in either the comments or the Reporters' note, which simply
recognizes that sometimes courts are willing to find post-sale confusion
actionable and sometimes they are not. Given the concerns expressed in the
cases cited,96 one can hypothesize that the Reporters were particularly
concerned about cases where the quality of the unauthorized goods threatens
the reputational interests of the trademark owner. In some promotional goods
cases (imagine threadbare and ragged unauthorized "Ford" floormats), this
concern would be a legitimate issue that could be accounted for under the ad
hoc focus on "reasonable steps" advocated by the court in Plasticolor.
Finally, illustrations 6 and 7 of section 20 deal with a subset of promo-
tional goods cases involving collective membership marks17-marks that
indicate membership in a fraternal order or national service organization, like
the Rainbow Girls98 or Jaycees. 9 Again, the illustrations make clear that
deceiving priospective purchasers of goods bearing collective membership
marks at the point of sale is actionable, while leaving open the critical question
of the standard under which to judge post-sale confusion. Under the Restate-
ment, it is impossible to answer the question at issue in Plasticolor and in
numerous other real market situations: When can the seller of a promotional
good escape liability for trademark infringement by clearly identifying itself
as the source of the good or otherwise disclaiming any sponsorship by the
trademark's owner?
for damage to the commercial interests of the trademark owner and to subsequently deceived
consumers in such a case is obvious.
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(low quality Reebok-style knock-offs infringed higher priced Reebok shoes); Ferrari S.P.A.
Esercizio Fabriche Automobili E Corse v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (imitation
Ferrari shell placed on lower quality Corvette body infringed famous Ferrari Spider), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1219 (1992).
97. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 20 cmt. e, illus. 6 & 7.
98. See Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d
1079 (5th Cir. 1982) (permitting an independent jeweler to sell unauthorized goods bearing
collective mark).
99. See United States Jaycees v. San Francisco Junior Chamber of Commerce, 354 F. Supp.
61 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (continued use of mark by local chapter after it disaffiliated found to
infringe), aff'd, 513 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
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5. Dilution and Mixed-Use Trademarks
The final section of the Plasticolor opinion considers liability under the
California trademark anti-dilution statute. Such statutes create liability for
some unauthorized trademark uses, even in the absence of any likelihood of
confusion, and therefore pose a potential problem for those making ornamental
uses of trademarks on promotional goods. Interestingly, Judge Kozinski and
the Restatement come to the same conclusion about the applicability of dilution
statutes. In considering the question of whether Plasticolor's use of Ford trade-
marks somehow "dilutes" them, Judge Kozinski concludes, "If anything, such
use is likely to increase the distinctiveness of Ford's marks. "1"u Similarly,
the Restatement section covering dilution, section 25, makes a strong
distinction between the "trademark" and "nontrademark" use of a product
designation.'' No liability is incurred for a use which is ornamental rather
than source-identifying. The comments make clear that
[n]ontrademark uses, because they do not create an association with a
different user's goods, services, or business, are unlikely to dilute the
distinctiveness of a mark. In most instances such uses are intended to refer
back to the original trademark owner and serve to confirm rather than
undermine the associational significance of the mark. For example, the use
of another's mark in comparative advertising or as mere ornamentation on
the subsequent user's goods does not dilute the distinctiveness of the mark
102
The Restatement rationale for excluding ornamental uses from liability under
dilution statutes dovetails nicely with Judge Kozinski's position in Plasticolor.
D. A Critique of the Restatement Approach
With the exception of its straightforward denial of liability for dilution in
section 25, the Restatement is frustratingly ambiguous with regard to the big
questions raised by cases like Plasticolor. The functionality of ornamental
marks is not addressed by the Restatement's functionality section; to make
100. Plasticolor, 713 F. Supp. at 1349 (quoting Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555
F. Supp. 1188, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), that "defendants' use only operates to strengthen
plaintiffs' marks").
101. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 25(1) ("An actor is subject to liability under an
antidilution statute if the actor uses such a designation in a manner that is likely to associate the
other's mark with the goods, services, or business of the actor . . . ."); see also id. § 25, cmt.
a ("The rules stated in Subsection (1) apply only when the actor uses the other's mark as a means
of identification for the actor's own goods, services, or business.").
102. Id. § 25 cmt. i.
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matters worse, no rule is given to govern the scope of the actionability of post-
sale confusion. Given the willingness of some courts to find those who market
unauthorized promotional goods liable for creating a likelihood of confusion
as to the sponsorship of the goods,0 3 potential entrepreneurs must be asking
themselves with increasing frequency the question posed above: When can the
seller of promotional goods escape liability for trademark infringement by
clearly identifying itself as the source of the goods or otherwise disclaiming
any sponsorship by the trademark's owner? A parsing of the Restatement does
not provide an adequate answer.
The policy concerns detailed above'04 suggest not only that the public
deserves a clear answer, but that the level of protection provided to ornamental
marks suggested by Judge Kozinski in Plasticolor is desirable. A case-by-case
focus on the reasonable precautions that can be taken to reduce post-sale
confusion preserves most of the source-identifying value of the mark and most
of the functional value of the mark. If the user of an ornamental mark takes
all cost-effective precautions to reduce post-sale confusion, then the user
should be privileged to utilize the mark. Permitting such uses will result in
increased competition in promotional goods, lower prices, and greater variety
and accessibility.
Permitting ornamental uses also implicitly recognizes that much of the
value of many marks is derived not from the owner's expenditures, but
through the efforts, energy, and devotion of those who love a particular team,
institution, or product. Those who create value should have some access to
what they have wrought.
In the realm of generic trademarks, the public has on many occasions
appropriated for itself the entire value of a certain trademark by using it
generically. Changing public perception and use of formerly strong trade-
marks, such as thermos, aspirin, cellophane, and many others, have resulted
in their becoming the unprotected common name for a good, free for all to
use. Under the doctrine of genericity, trademark owners know that they may
someday lose control of their marks, depending on how the public uses them.
When the mark becomes more valuable to the public than to the private owner,
ownership changes hands as a matter of both federal and state trademark
law. 5 Interestingly, this may not be bad for business, as demonstrated by
the hope of Anheuser-Busch that it's "LA" mark for low alcohol beer would
become generic, just like Miller's tremendously successful use of the generic
term "Lite."l°6
103. See cases cited supra notes 60 & 96.
104. See supra section I.B.
105. See Landes & Posner, supra note 29, at 291-96.
106. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 750 F.2d 631, 643 (8th Cir. 1984);
KITCH & PERLMAN, supra note 29, at 286.
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It is unfortunate for both entrepreneurs and the general public that the
Restatement does not unambiguously privilege most ornamental uses of
trademarks on promotional goods.
II. ADVERTISING, CELEBRITIES, AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
Recent scholarship 7 and some judicial opinions"' suggest that celeb-
rity personae also have functional or generic aspects that should be reserved
for public use. To see this, one must first identify the intrinsic, nongeneric
aspect of the celebrity persona. An examination of cases protecting celebrity
personae reveal that their primary commercial value is related to the
connection consumers make between their acquisitional preferences and the
celebrity. For example, many consumers purchase items (posters, coffee mugs,
T-shirts, buttons, etc.) bearing the likeness of their favorite celebrities, or they
are willing to pay substantial sums of money to see celebrities perform. In
addition, consumers frequently purchase goods or services endorsed by their
favorite celebrities-Joe Dimaggio has sold many, many Mr. Coffee coffee
makers. Consumers who buy a "piece" of a celebrity, or otherwise express a
preference for the unique attributes of a particular persona, demonstrate the
power of the connection protected by publicity rights statutes 9 and common
law decisions"' in the area.
Consumer preference in these cases is usually directly related to the
intrinsic attributes of the celebrity. For the starstruck teenager who wants a
poster of Cindy Crawford, a poster of an unknown generic beautiful woman
simply will not do. The Mr. Coffee folks could have chosen a generic,
distinguished looking, graying gentleman to sell their product, but their
understanding of the power of celebrity militated a different advertising choice.
This connection with consumer preference is unambiguously (and properly)
protected by the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition."' In fact, the
Restatement's focus on protecting the "commercial value of a person's
identity" against unauthorized uses "for the purposes of trade" seems tailor-
made to protect the interests described above."
2
107. See supra note 4.
108. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993).
109. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 990, 3344 (West Supp. 1996).
110. See Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
111. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, §§ 46-49 (affording protection against infringement of
publicity rights) and § 4 (affording protection against false advertising, including claims of false
sponsorship).
112. Id. § 46.
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Not all commercial references to celebrity personae are, however, pure
exploitations of the unique or intrinsic personal qualities of the individual
celebrity. Because the meaning of celebrity is often determined by the public,
frequently certain aspects of a celebrity persona are employed generically. For
example, Michael Jackson is not only a unique musical entertainer, but also
a common symbol for broader notions of androgyny. Marilyn Monroe was not
only an underrated actress, but also the embodiment of the more abstract
notion of sex appeal. You get the idea: John Wayne = rugged frontier spirit
and patriotism; Sharon Stone = sexual danger; Michael Jordan = athleticism
and grace; Deion Sanders = speed, greed, and ego; George Wallace =
racism; Martin Luther King = nonviolence. One could expand the list
indefinitely. "3
In other words, a celebrity may lose control over his or her persona in the
same way that a trademark owner can lose control over its property when its
mark becomes used generically. When a persona takes on a symbolic aspect
or is employed to express an abstract concept, the public has a legitimate
interest in maintaining the value of that use. Unfortunately, the Restatement
inadequately distinguishes between: (1) advertisers who wrongfully exploit the
connection consumers make between the unique personal qualities of a
celebrity and their acquisitional preferences, and (2) advertisers who merely
reference the generic attributes of a celebrity persona or who employ the
persona to communicate an idea to consumers. The discussion of a recent case
demonstrates the danger of failing to make this distinction. An examination
and critique of the Restatement approach will follow.
A. The Problem With Vanna
In 1992 the Ninth Circuit, sometimes referred to as the "Court of Appeals
for Hollywood" because of the relevance of its opinions for the entertainment
industry, rendered the most controversial publicity rights decision in twenty
years." 4 In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc."5 the court found
113. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 4, 20 COL.-VLA J.L. & ARTS at 129 (noting that
"[c]haraeters like James Dean, Judy Garland, John Wayne, and Madonna do double duty").
114. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, supra note 4; David S.
Welkowitz, Catching Smoke, Nailing JELL-O to a Wall: The Vanna White Case and the Limits
of Celebrity Rights, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 67 (1995); John R. Braatz, Note, White v. Samsung
Electronics America: The Ninth Circuit Turns a New Letter in California Right of Publicity Law,
15 PACE L. REV. 161 (1994); Patricia B. Frank, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics America,
Inc., 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1115 (1994); Linda J. Stack, Note, White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc.'s Expansion of the Right of Publicity: Enriching Celebrities at the Expense of Free
Speech, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1189 (1995); William M. Hebever III, Comment, The Overprotec-
tion of Celebrity: A Comment on White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 22 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 729 (1994). The leading treatise on the subject devotes an entire appendix to Judge
Kozinski's dissent to the denial of en bane rehearing in the case. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE
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Samsung Electronics liable for broadcasting a television advertisement that
depicted a robotic version of "Wheel of Fortune" letter-turner Vanna White
in the year 2012 A.D. The ad was part of campaign that depicted Samsung
products with "hypothesiz[ed] outrageous future outcomes" for current cultural
phenomena in order to convey "the message that the Samsung product would
still be in use by that time."16 Other ads conveying the notion that time
would change some institutions, but not Samsung quality, depicted talk show
host Morton Downey, Jr. as a viable presidential candidate in 2008 A.D., and
raw steak as a health food in 2010 A.D." 7
Neither the analysis of the majority opinion, nor the blistering dissent of
Judge Kozinski from the court's denial of a motion for rehearing en banc, is
particularly convincing. The majority properly concluded that White's identity
may have been appropriated by Samsung, because even though the ad did not
include an actual picture of her or refer to the robot by name, most viewers
were likely to understand the commercial as a reference to Vanna. lI8 The
opinion, however, goes beyond the existing case law by glibly concluding that
White prevails because "[tihe law protects the celebrity's sole right to
exploit. . . her fame ... ."9 After the majority's long and thoughtful
discussion of whether the depiction of a robotic Vanna really constituted an
appropriation of her persona, the absence of a discussion of whether that
appropriation was wrongful is striking.
As the relevant Restatement sections make clear, no absolute rule has ever
prevented third parties from profiting from a celebrity's fame. No "sole right
to exploit" has ever existed. Illustrations five and six in section 47 present two
common situations of lawful unauthorized profiting from a celebrity persona:
5. A is a well-known actress. B, a magazine publisher, places a photo-
graph of A on the cover of an issue of the magazine. An article about A,
consisting of several photographs and brief commentary, is included in the
magazine. One of the photographs is taken from a scene in a recent movie
in which A appeared partially unclothed. B has not infringed A's right of
publicity.
6. A is the subject of an unauthorized biography published by B. The
biography is entitled "A" and contains a photograph of A on the dust
jacket. The biography contains numerous false statements concerning facts
and incidents in A's life. B has not infringed A's right of publicity. 120
RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY app. A (1995).
115. 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh'g en banc denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (1993).
116. Id. at 1396.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1399.
119. Id.
120. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 47 emt. c, illus. 5 & 6.
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Making money from the fame of another is a time-honored American
tradition. The majority opinion in White, which cursorily equates appropriation
of image with liability, has no basis in precedent or sound policy. On the other
hand, Judge Kozinski's lengthy attack on the opinion leaves something to be
desired. He does a wonderful job of pointing out the big issues at stake in the
case121 and providing a warning of the dangers posed by such a gross
expansion of the law, but he does not offer a test to distinguish White
from many of the opinions that preceded it. He disagrees with the majority on
the initial question of whether the robotic reference to Vanna White is an
appropriation at all. The threat the decision poses to the public domain
and its potential stifling of creativity are palpable, but Judge Kozinski's dissent
fails to garner a majority of the Ninth Circuit judges because his assertion that
a reference is not an appropriation seems equally applicable to generally
accepted precedent.
Two cases cited by the majority cause problems for Kozinski. In
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.'24 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals found Reynolds liable for using a photograph of Motschenbacher's
famous race car in a television commercial. Later, in Midler v. Ford Motor
Co., '5 the court found Ford and its advertising agency liable for using a
Bette Midler sound-alike to record the soundtrack for a television commercial.
Judge Kozinski's focus on the substantiality of the reference to a celebrity not
directly depicted really does not provide a framework for distinguishing
between Midler and Motschenbacher, both relatively uncontroversial opinions,
and the facts presented in White.
121. White, 989 F.2d at 1513. According to Judge Kozinski:
Something very dangerous is going on here. Private property, including
intellectual property, is essential to our way of life. It provides an incentive for
investment and innovation; it stimulates the flourishing of our culture; it protects the
moral entitlements of people to the fruits of their labors. But reducing too much to
private property can be bad medicine. Private land, for instance, is far more useful
if separated from other private land by public streets, roads and highways. Public
parks, utility rights-of-way and sewers reduce the amount of land in private hands,
but vastly enhance the value of the property that remains.
So too it is with intellectual property. Overprotectingintellectual property is as harmful
as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain.
Id. at 1513.
122. Id. at 1515 (The majority is "creating a new and much broader property right, a right
unknown in California law. It's replacing the existing balance between the interests of the
celebrity and those of the public by a different balance, one substantially more favorable to the
celebrity. Instead of having an exclusive right in her name, likeness, signature or voice, every
famous person now has an exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of her.").
123. Id. at 1517.
124. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
125. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
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If Judge Kozinski is correct regarding the important policy issues
concerning public expression present in White, then distinguishing the three
cases is critical. The distinction between White and its predecessors is
unwittingly revealed in both the majority opinion in the case and Professor
McCarthy's critique of Judge Kozinski's dissent in his authoritative treatise on
publicity rights. 6 In discussing the offending commercial, the majority ac-
knowledges that Samsung's purpose was to convey "the message that the
Samsung product would still be in use" in the twenty-first century. 7
Similarly, McCarthy summarizes the commercial as "conveying the message
that Samsung products would still be around then. "2 The invocation of
Vanna was not made to convince Vanna fans to buy the product, but rather to
convey in especially vivid fashion the abstract concept of durability. This use
of the celebrity persona to convey a concept is significantly different from
those presented in Midler and Motschenbacher, where the advertisers were
attempting to capitalize on the intrinsic attractiveness of the unique attributes
of a particular celebrity.
As David Welkowitz has recently noted:
Thus, the critical difference between White and other cases permitting a
right of publicity claim is that Vanna White was no more than a literary
reference in Samsung's advertisement. Samsung did not exploit her image
to gain some positive associational value. Not all uses of a celebrity
constitute wrongful apropriation... where the celebrity is merely a point
of reference, the celebrity's commercial value is not being used. 29
As McCarthy explains, the tort of misappropriation of publicity rights
"consists of using without payment the identity of a person to help attract
attention to a commercial advertisement."' The commercials aired by Ford
in Midler and R.J. Reynolds in Motschenbacher were designed to exploit
consumers' commercial preference for the celebrities depicted in their
advertisements. Associating products with Midler's or Motschenbacher's
unique qualities and styles made the products more attractive. Samsung's use
was entirely different. It did not make allusions to Vanna White in order to
increase the likelihood that Vanna fans would buy its product. The use of her
image was an incidental, albeit important, part of an abstract message about
durability. As the majority admits, without understanding the importance of
its admission, Samsung, unlike many who appropriate a public persona, did
126. See McCARTHY, supra note 109, app. A-1.
127. White, 971 F.2d at 1396.
128. MCCARTHY, supra note 114, app. A-1.
129. See Welkowitz, supra note 114, at 79-80.
130. MCCARTHY, supra note 114, app. A-2. Unfortunately, McCarthy fails to consider that
Samsung is not trying to attract consumers who are attracted to Vanna's persona.
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not choose to use Vanna in an attempt to attract those consumers who have a
preference for her unique qualities.
B. The Restatement and the Absence of a Middle Ground
The Restatement cites White uncritically 3' and does not attempt to
distinguish it from cases like Midler or Motschenbacher. Section 46 of the
Restatement provides for liability for appropriation of "the commercial value
of a person's identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness,
or other indicia of identity for the purposes of trade."'3 Section 47 then
defines "for the purposes of trade" as any use of the indicia of identity "in
advertising the user's goods or services." 3 On the face of sections 46 and
47, any reference to a celebrity in the course of advertising appears to be
actionable, regardless of the purpose or function of the reference. Presumably,
the hypothetical local car dealership posed in the introduction that advertises
its new line of cars as having "finer lines than Sharon Stone, quicker moves
than Michael Jordan, and more power than Mike Tyson" would be liable to
all three of the referenced celebrities.
Interestingly, the official comments offer support for a distinction between
the issue posed by White and my hypothetical, and by cases like Midler and
Moteschenbacher. Comment c to section 47 states that the "use of a person's
identity primarily for the purpose of communicating information or expressing
ideas is not generally actionable as a violation of the person's right of
publicity."' 34 This is precisely the rationale that explains why White is out
of line with prior decisions. This dividing line provides a middle ground that
recognizes both the need to protect the valuable attraction consumershave for
some celebrities and the need to maintain the expressive/generic/functional
aspects of a celebrity persona in the vocabulary of the public domain. The
comment describes the liability side of the line quite clearly: "[I]f the name or
likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work . . . the user may be
subject to liability for a use of the other's identity in advertising."1,3
Unfortunately, this commentary is used only to support the excepting from
liability of "the use of a person's identity in news reporting, commentary,
entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is
incidental to such uses."' 36 Although the exceptions apply even when one is
"successful in obtaining a commercial advantage from.. . [the] use of
131. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 46, reporters' note to cmt. d.
132. Id. § 46.
133. Id. § 47.
134. Id. § 47 cmt. c.
135. Id.
136. RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 47.
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another's identity, "137 they do not generally extend to expressive use of a
celebrity persona in advertising."'3 The comments do not explain why putting
Vanna's picture on the cover of an unauthorized biography to enhance its sales
should be permitted, 39 but employing a robotic Vanna to make a point about
the durability of electronic consumer goods should not be. Although the
commentary goes a long way toward providing an analytical framework to
govern cases like White, the rules themselves seem to prohibit any reference
at all to a celebrity in commercial advertising.
C. The Road Not Taken
Section 47 should import the language it uses in its comment c to except
from liability the use of a person's identity primarily for the purpose of
communicating information or expressing ideas. Only "if the name or likeness
is used [primarily] to attract attention to a work [or product]"' 40 should
liability follow. Had the Restatement applied this distinction to all uses of a
celebrity persona, it would have better balanced the celebrity's interest in
exploiting consumer preferences with the public's interest in the effective
expression of ideas and communication. Would we have heard Samsung's
message so clearly if an announcer had merely told us, "Samsung products are
very durable and last a long time"?
As noted earlier, a celebrity persona can be used as a magnet to attract
interest in a particular product or performance, or it can be used in a purely
functional way. When the use is functional, then the public interest outweighs
the celebrity's desire to maintain complete control over references to his or her
existence. Whether the functional use occurs in private conversation or in the
course of commercial advertising, the public's interest in efficient, effective,
and vivid communication is equally strong. In the absence of a compelling
reason for restraint, we all have an interest in allowing those who want to
speak to us to optimize their means of communication.
III. CONCLUSION
Overall, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition is a tremendous
success, an authoritative and user-friendly resource for students, academics,
practitioners, and judges. Inevitably, even great accomplishments contain some
flaws. In particular, the Restatement commits two sins of omission in its
137. Id. § 47 cmt. c.
138. "Incidental" advertising related to a permitted use is not actionable. For example, a record
store could display a poster of a rock star in conjunction with the sale of his or her records.
139. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 47 cmt. c, illus. 6.
140. Id. § 47 cmt. c.
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treatment of the ornamental use of trademarks on promotional goods and its
treatment of references to celebrity personae in advertising. The failure to craft
rules to maintain the balance between a complex calculus of interests in both
situations may lead to an unsettling future.
A brief return to the two hypotheticals presented in the introduction helps
summarize the point: (1) After the World Series, an entrepreneur sells high
quality T-shirts, coffee mugs, pens, ashtrays, etc., bearing the trademark
"Atlanta Braves." All these promotional goods are plainly labeled as
unauthorized by the Atlanta Braves. No consumers are likely to be confused
at the point of purchase. (2) A local automobile dealership advertises his
manufacturer's new sports car as having "finer lines than Sharon Stone,
quicker moves than Michael Jordan, and more power than Mike Tyson." His
allusions are made in an effort to sell his product, but consumers are not likely
to believe that Stone, Jordan, or Tyson endorse or are formally associated with
the car. The weight of common law precedent and sound public policy militate
against finding liability in either case; however, due to the failure of the
Restatement to address adequately these two situations, compelling arguments
for liability may be offered.
Any liability suggested by the Restatement does not seem to be a
deliberate effort on the part of the drafters to change the law, but rather the
failure, in the context of trademark law, to specifically address the issue of
post-sale confusion, and in the context of the publicity rights law, to consider
fully all the expressive uses of celebrity personae. A Restatement more
sensitive to both precedent and public policy would have: (1) made clear that
post-sale confusion caused by the ornamental use of a trademark on promotion-
al goods is permissible as long as the user has taken all cost effective
precautions to avoid confusion, and (2) extended the "expressive use"/"magn-
etic use" dichotomy to all cases involving the use of a celebrity persona.
Interestingly, the two situations present similar struggles between the
public's interest in maintaining access to the functional features of words and
symbols that are valuable for communication, and "the natural tendency of
legal rights to express themselves in absolute terms to the exclusion of all
else." '4 The Restatement could have done a better job of resisting that
tendency.
141. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 n.13 (1984)
(commenting on attempts to expand intellectual property rights under copyright and patent law).
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